This article presents a model of haircuts and economic capital for repos. We propose a credit approach to solve haircuts such that the exposure to market risk meets a prescribed credit rating scale measured by expected loss. Specifically for securities financing business, a credit risk capital approach is also adopted where the borrower dependent haircut is set to a level such that the resultant credit risk VaR is zero. The repo haircuts model incorporates asset risk, borrower credit risk, wrong way risk, and market liquidity risk. Double exponential jump-diffusion type processes are used to model single asset or portfolio price dynamics. Borrower credit is captured by a log-Ornstein-Uhlenbeck default intensity model. Economic capital defined either as unexpected loss from CVaR or expected shortfall is computed for securities financing transactions with negotiated haircuts, to form the basis to levy a capital charge in pre-trade and to fair value in post-trade. Numerical techniques employing two-sided Laplace transform inversion and maximum likelihood estimation of the jump-diffusion model are applied to compute haircuts of SPX500 index, US corporate bond and CMBS indices. Preliminary findings are that stress period calibrated jump-diffusion models can produce haircuts at the levels of BASEL's supervisory haircuts and that repo economic capital far exceeds expected loss and cost of capital has to be included in repo-style transactions pricing. JEL: G10, G17, G22.
Introduction
Haircuts are the main risk management tool of securities financing transactions (SFT), a key element of the regulatory reform of the shadow banking system post the financial crisis of 2007 -2009 (FSB 2015 . Indeed, haircuts entered the regulatory landscape since BASEL 2 in 2004. BASEL 3 has a schedule of the standardized supervisory market price volatility haircuts for the calculation of EAD of a repo-style transaction and collateralized OTC derivatives following the collateral haircut approach. For advanced banks adopting BASEL's market risk capital rules, internal models are allowed subject to certain qualitative and quantitative requirements. Although no technical specifics are given, a VaR (value-at-risk) based methodology is commonly implemented, e.g., haircuts estimated as 10 day VaR of the collateral assets at 99% confidence level using at least one year historical data. FSB's new framework further strengthens BASEL 3 VaR based haircut methodology by establishing a haircut floor for non-centrally cleared securities financing transactions and requiring use of at least 5 year's historical data including at least one stress period.
The qualitative standards of the haircuts framework proposed are prudential reflections of existing haircuts methodologies which draw from the desire of withstanding extreme price declines observed from historical price data. The historical data requirement alone however could be a challenge as pricing data (price or spread) is not always available, or available but not for sufficient length, or not reliable at all for some collateral types. The price behavior of US RMBS (residential mortgage backed securities) in 2007 ~2009 is unprecedented, for example, rendering its prior pricing history meaningless for haircut setting. A VaR based haircut model would have still predicted single digit haircut for AA-or higher rated securitization debts, in line with BASEL II's 8% haircut for corporate and securitization debts rated AAA to AA-with residual maturity greater than 5 years, while banks promptly responded by hiking up haircuts in multiples.
Repos' role in leading to the default of Lehmann Brother and near collapse of the financial system has attracted academic, regulatory, and industry research interests. Gorton and Metrick (2011) presented evidence that repo haircuts increased dramatically in the US bilateral repo market during the crisis, especially those concerning asset-backed securities (ABS). A repo run on the private label ABS, although limited in sheer size, hit the few most vulnerable dealer banks (Krishnamurthy et al 2014) . In the US tri-party repo markets, however, unsophisticated cash investors usually sign up dealers' haircuts offer sheets but they tend to shut down lending completely rather than trying to ask for higher haircuts at time of stress (Copeland, Martin and Walker 2011) . On the regulatory front, FSB responded by enlisting strengthening oversight and regulation of shadow banking as a major task. The industry also sets out to understand theoretical uncertainty surrounding haircuts (Comotto, 2012) and generally believes that haircuts are procyclical and vary with borrower credit. Infante (2015) shows borrower credit as a determinant of repo haircuts. While econometric studies have helped improve our understanding of repo haircuts, they are hindered by a severe lack of empirical data on haircuts. On the other hand, mathematical models linking counterparty credit and other factors to haircuts have been absent in the mathematical finance literature.
As intellectual inquiries advance, new industry trends also emerge. Securities financing businesses have been adapting to various measures of reforming the financial system such as supplemental leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), and net stable funding ratio (NSFR). Recent business developments have seen more customized or structured repo transactions. Dynamic haircuts designed to delever the trades are rare but not impossible. In bilateral repos and bilaterally negotiated tri-party repos, repo tenors are on average longer than pre-crisis, most extending beyond 3 months 2 , often with evergreen features 3 . Repos with tenors longer than one year are welcomed products for commercial banks and insurance companies which treat them as a form of longer term investments. Lengthened tenors necessitate consideration of counterparty credit risk and use of counterparty sensitive haircuts to mitigate counterparty credit risk is a necessary requirement. In collateral upgrade trades (or collateral swaps), for example, two sides' collateral haircuts differentials drive the economics of the trades. Meanwhile, a securities broker/dealer facilitating the flow of securities between investors and cash rich pension fund and 2 BASEL LCR requires coverage of a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario. For bank borrowers, three month tenor then seems a minimal requirement to fit with the 30 day horizon in LCR. Repo tenors longer than a year may evolve around the 1 year time horizon of NSFR, subject to final ratios assigned to repos. 3 As an ample, a repo is called '4/3/4' evergreen, meaning that the original repo term is 4 months and that with 3 months remaining, it can be rolled, i.e., closed out and a new 4 month term repo is entered. If one party does not agree to the roll, it will run off the remaining 3 month term and mature. Other popular evergreen formats include '6/5/6', '9/6/9' and '12/9/12'. asset managers finds needs of fair value repos placed in trading books. To accommodate these developments, an understanding and robust modeling capacity of haircuts become a pressing need.
Before a mathematical model of haircuts can be developed, we first need to reconcile the conflicting views between the regulatory requirements and SFT business practice. The FSB haircuts framework explicitly excludes consideration of borrowers' credit quality: any such consideration would only increase the haircuts established without consideration of their credits. It apparently disconnects with existing business practices where haircuts are subject to factors other than the asset price volatility alone. Haircuts' dependency on counterparty, although not known exactly, is thought to be weak to the industry (Comotto 2012) and researches cited earlier.
Repos, as a short dated wholesale funding tool, is economically a private monetization tool for financial collateral. As such, it needs to be designed to fulfill basic characteristics of money, that is, independence from carriers or holders of the money for ease of transfer. Since the monetization is between two private parties, economically there is no difference from a secured margin loan. For a bank, it is natural to compare a reverse repo with its other lending activities. The industry's practice therefore concerns with the economics of the monetization process, while the regulatory stand appears to be based on its transferability perspective.
The different perspectives of private monetization can also be seen from money market funds, which invest in debt securities characterized by short maturities and minimal credit risk to maintain the lowest volatility in the funds' net asset values unitized at par. In the US, the overall maturity of assets of a money market fund must be less than 2 months, reduced from 3 months in 2010 following the crisis. Money market funds are themselves heavily invested in reverse repos lending money to securities broker/dealers in the triparty repo market. These repos are mostly overnight repos, the shortest tenor possible. As these funds are passive lenders and do not actively manage their exposure, it is reasonable to apply haircuts insensitive to the borrowers --the broker/dealers of similar credit quality. Furthermore because they are not in the market business, their desire of a stable par value works best if haircuts are countercyclical. Broker/dealers are in the business of market and have the resources to manage credit risk. When they turn around to lend the money in the bilateral repo form to hedge funds and asset managers, their haircuts can be designed in accordance with their clientile which exhibit a large dispersion in terms of credit quality. Procyclicality is likely but they can employ wholesale credit approach to actively manage that.
Counterparty independent haircuts and dependent haircuts are both valid propositions. Question becomes whether a single modeling approach can accommodate these seemingly conflicting views. For the money market funds, the haircuts applied to the b/d's collateral securities have to be high enough in order to not produce any loss with the maximum decline of collateral value during a liquidation window. This is naturally catered by the VaR approach. For b/d and banks comparing repos with their wholesale lending activities, linking haircuts to a target credit profile is natural. While a typical wholesale credit approach would look at probability of default in the whole duration of the repo trade, disregarding a counterparty's credit is equivalent to assuming the borrower's immediate jump-to-default. From the repo lender's perspective, counterparty independent haircuts require capturing loss given default, while counterparty dependent haircuts cumulative loss incurred upon counterparty's default during the trade lifetime. With this characterization, we can unify these two types of haircuts in one framework. In this article, we propose to adopt the credit risk approach to haircuts modeling, i.e., by examining lender's loss profile as measured by usual expected loss (EL) and unexpected loss (UL). A haircut can be defined such that its application results in a prescribed EL or EC target, with the former possibly matching that of certain credit rating criteria.
In "the absence of a clear understanding of the constitution of haircuts/initial margins" (Comotto, 2012) , this article contributes to the literature with a candidate internal model of haircuts for regulatory capital purposes and a counterparty dependent haircut model for securities financing businesses. The former captures asset volatility risk in a jump-diffusion dynamics and can also be used to discount market values of non-cash securities posted as collateral in OTC derivatives margin under CSA or with CCP. The latter models borrower's credit risk with a mean-reverting, lognormal default intensity process. General wrong way risk (WWR) is captured via the negative correlation between the intensity and the jump diffusion asset return process, while specific WWR is incorporated as a single jump-on-default, in the same spirit as a liquidity risk premium on asset disposals.
Another contribution of this article is the emphasis on and computation of economic capital. A business conducting securities financing transactions has to measure the trade economics in addition to regulatory capital requirements, which is not intended to dictate transaction economic terms. A repo trade could be and is often done at a haircut level lower than the supervisory haircut 4 and would attract some regulatory capital. If the trade is compensated enough in terms of economic risk and capital usage (return on economic or regulatory capital), it could still be a good trade. Specifically, a business would need a haircut model that estimates a fair level of haircut given certain credit targets and compute economic capital if the traded haircut deviates from the fair level. Economic capital is particularly important in dealing with the problem of market procyclicality which can be more efficiently addressed in a market oriented way. A business in a credit expansion cycle, for example, can price a haircut at the current market condition, and fair value the repo trade. Any mark-to-market exposure to borrowers then can be handled by its counterparty credit risk management. Indeed the concern about haircuts' market procyclicality is caused by fixing a haircut and leaving it on an accrual or banking book where its counterparty risk is not actively managed. This could be a better alternative than mandating a stable haircut over the business cycle.
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a single period model, solving haircuts to meet the best credit quality rating solely on the asset. This is the case for a regulatory haircuts model. Section 3 incorporates borrower's credit captured by a log OU (Ornstein-Uhlenbeck) default intensity process correlated with the jump-diffusion process of the asset price. Section 4 shows computation results of haircuts for US main equities, investment grade corporate bonds, and CMBS as representative of securitized products. Section 5 concludes with remarks about future research.
Single Margin Period of Risk Model
Outside of the securities financing space, margining with collateral has also become a central piece in the post-crisis redesign of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets. Margin requirements are covered, for example, in Credit Support Annex (CSA) to ISDA, central counterparty (CCP)'s clearing agreements, and BCBS-IOSCO non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives margin requirements. Eligible collateral consists of, in general, cash or cash equivalents (e.g., treasury bills), government or agency debts, high grade corporate or municipal debts, equities, and asset backed securities or securitizations. Cash dominates collateral but non-cash collateral are significant, consisting of 25% of total collateral (ISDA 2015) . Non-cash collateral brings about market, credit and liquidity risk factors of varying degrees, and is subject to haircuts. As the main purpose of collateral here is to mitigate counterparty credit risk, a separation of collateral risk factors and liquidity from OTC derivatives exposure is desired. This is possibly the rational behind BASEL III and FSB's enhanced haircut framework that requires counterparty independent haircuts.
A margin period of risk (MPR) is a time period starting from the last date when margin covering a SFT or OTC derivatives netting set is met to the date when the defaulting counterparty is closed out with completion of collateral assets disposal. The MPR could cover a number of events or processes, including re-val, margin calculation, margin call, default notification and default grace period, and finally time to sell collateral and in the case of OTC derivatives, to rehedge or dispose the derivatives exposure. A valuation dispute window adds to the mix, as a near default party could tactically employ a dispute to buy time when managing its situation. While the exact length of a MPR depends on legal and process controls, repos' MPR is generally much shorter than OTC margin's, mainly because of repos' special legal status in the bankruptcy code and OTC derivatives' proneness to valuation delays and disputes. BASEL III has established minimum MPRs, 5 business days for SFT, 10 days for normal OTC netting sets, and 20 days for large netting sets with the number of trades exceeding 5000 or netting sets containing illiquid collateral or OTC derivatives that are not easily revalued and replaced. MPRs are to be adjusted higher if recent pricing disputes actually last longer than the set MPR.
The lender's exposure in a repo during the MPR is simply principal plus accrual and unpaid interest. For an OTC netting set, the mark-to-market of the derivatives could fluctuate according to their leverage effects. The derivatives exposure is formally set on the early termination date which could be days behind the point of default. The surviving counterparty, however, could have delta hedged against market factors following the point of default so that the derivative exposure remains a more manageable gamma exposure during the MPR. As we aim at developing a generic haircut model, we assume that exposure during the MPR is constant.
When the collateral assets are liquidated, it might take days if the collateral portfolio is illiquid, large, or concentrated in certain sectors of asset classes. Market prices would have moved, bid/ask spreads could widen, and some assets might have to be sold at a discount. Except for onthe-run government bonds and short maturities debts, market liquidity risk is sizeable for fixed income instruments, including significant bid-ask spread, limited market size and depth, low frequency of price observations, and reliance on valuation services rather than actual market quotations. In particular, market liquidity risk is more pronounced with securitization and lower grade corporates. A valuation discount is prudent to have.
In what is called a specific wrong way risk situation, a large counterparty's default may cause a short term stress in the asset classes. This can be intuitively captured by a jump-on-default, which in the simplest form can be implemented as an additional liquidation discount.
Loss based haircut definition
To summarize, in an idealized setting, we consider a counterparty C's default time at t, when the margin is last met, an MPR of u during which there is no margin posting, and finally the collateral assets are sold at time t+u instantaneously at the market with a possible discount g. Exposure to C is assumed flat after t.
Denote the collateral market value as B(t), exposure to the defaulting counterparty (or borrower) as E(t), E(t)=(1-h)B(t)
, where h is a constant haircut, 1>h ≥0. The margin agreement is assumed to have a zero minimum transfer amount. Lender B would have a residual exposure (E(t)-
, where g is a constant discount rate at sales to reflect market liquidity risk, 1>g≥0. We can write lender's loss function as follows,
Conditional on default happening at time t, the above determines a one-period loss distribution driven by asset price movements.
For the one period model, we set t=0. The loss function directly relates to the price return of the period.
is price decline, haircut h provides a cushion to y before a loss is incurred. Brunnermerer and Pederson (2009) define initial margin based on VaR, i.e., probability of price decline exceeding the haircut is less than a small probability 1-q, say 1% with a confidence interval of q=0.99. Mathematically, h is given by
Note that, under g=0, Pr(y>h) equals to Pr(L(s)>0).
If the price decline is less or equal to h, there is no loss. The VaR based definition is equivalent to the first dollar loss criteria, adopted by rating agencies such as Standard and Poor's (S&P). In light of the adoption of the expected shortfall (ES) in BCBS's Fundamental Review of the Trading Book, we could also define the haircut as ES under the q-quantile,
Whether h or hES, the market risk capital associated with holding the asset for the given MPR is zero, as is a multiple of VaR or ES.
Departing from these market risk measurement based definitions, we introduce a new definition of haircuts based on expected loss (EL) target L0,
As will be shown in the next section, the EL based definition naturally fits when counterparty credit is taken into account. It therefore provides a unified definition for regulatory haircuts and repo haircuts.
The expected loss target L0 can be set based on EL criteria of certain designated high credit rating, whether internal or external. With Moody's approach, for example, one can set haircut to a level such that the expected (cumulative) loss satisfies the expected loss tolerance L0 of some predetermined Moody's rating target, e.g., Aa1
5 . A repo traded with a haircut at h or hES thus will have zero market risk VaR and zero market risk capital requirement 6 . This implies that we can also define a haircut to minimize capital requirement C0.
where EC is measured either at VaR or ES. In equations (4) and (5), loss L's holding period does not have to be an MPR. In fact, these two definitions apply general credit risk capital approach where the standard horizon is one year with a 99.9% confidence interval.
Asset Price Dynamics
The loss function is a deep out-of-the-money put on collateral asset which is predominantly determined by asset return's skew and tail distribution. We choose the mixed-exponential jumpdiffusion model (MEM, Cai & Kou 2011) , an extension of the double exponential jump-diffusion (DEJD) model widely used in exotic option pricing literature. DEJD and MEM are capable of producing a wide variety of skewed tail distributions while maintaining tractable transform analytics, including numerical Laplace inversion procedures with error controls and explicit density functions (Ramezani and Zeng 2007) for DEJD to allow maximum likelihood estimation of model parameters.
Consider a single asset collateral with a market price process B(t) modeled with a jump diffusion process,
where σa is the asset volatility, µ the return of the asset, W(t) a Brownian motion. N(t) is a Poisson process with intensity λ, Yj is a random variable denoting the magnitude of the j-th jump. The log return of asset price Bt has an explicit solution in the form of
With MEM, Yj, j=1, 2, ..., are a sequence of independent and identically distributed mixedexponential random variables with the pdf fY(x) given by 5 'AAA' or 'Aaa' rated corporates are numbered and there is basically no default history to study their default frequency and expected loss. Wholesale credit risk measurement methodologies normally combine AAA (Aaa) and AA+ (Aa1) into one top credit quality rating. 6 BASEL's VaR based market risk capital is defined as VaR times a regulatory multiplier with a minimum of 3. FRTB replaces VaR with ES but multiplier still applies.
where pu and qd are up jump and down jump switching probabilities, pu+qd=1. pl is the weight (not necessarily in probability sense) of the l-th up jump mixture exponentially distributed at a rate of ηl>1, Σpl=1. Similarly θj>0 is j-th down jump mixture's rate, qj weights that sum to 1, Σqj=1.
The probability of the cumulative loss L(u)≥b, i.e., the tail cumulative density function (cdf) can be mapped to Xu's cdf,
Fixing a haircut h, this gives loss distribution as a function of b. 
Numerical techniques
Computation of loss distribution and expected loss reduces to the cdf of Xt, the log return of the jump-diffusion asset price, and the undiscounted European put valuation. Below is a brief summary of the main formulae from Cai et al (2013) along with some improvement to fit our purposes.
The two-sided Laplace transform for the probability density function fX(t) of the log return of the mixed exponential jump-diffusion process X(t), t>0, denoted by , is given by Having computed the two-sided Laplace transform of the pdf , the two sided Laplacian inversion algorithm is used to solve for fX(t), as follows, where σ is a number in the ROAC, C>0 a shift constant to control discretization error, and N>0 the number of truncation terms to control truncation error. eD is discretization error solely governed by C>0. eT is the truncation error, for example for Lf , bounded as, a,b) is the upper incomplete gamma function of order a and lower bound b. Note that the parameters in equation (13) are for pdf inversion.
The same inversion formula applies to cdf and European call options, LF and LEUC . Different sets of parameters apply for cdf and call option, resulting in different C and N being used when calculating pdf, cdf and call option, see Cai et al (2013) for details.
Unlike the original paper where the Laplacian of the European call option price is conducted on log of the strike K, we derive the Laplacian of a put on log of normalized strike, i.e., the strike for the put is written as = 0 − , with current asset price B0, and the asset price at time t is = 0 . The two-sided Laplacian of a put payoff is derived as follows,
with ROAC of (-max(θj)-1, -1) .
This normalization allows the same error bounds control over the put payoff (loss) and the tail cdf of the loss under the same parameters C and N, which are separately established for call option and cdf in Cai et al (2013) . In our analysis, the expected loss and tail cdf of loss, which relate to put option payoff and cdf of Xt respectively, need to be calculated at the same time to be integrated on a pathwise basis. It is critical to compute them efficiently under the same set of parameters (shift C and truncation term N) to employ adaptive error control that ensures sufficient accuracy.
Candidate Model of Regulatory Haircuts
BASEL III permits banks to compute regulatory haircuts by using 'Repo VAR" model or "own estimates", with at least two years of historical data. The model described in this section meets the requirements and offers an alternative model of regulatory haircuts.
Regulatory haircuts are unequivocally computed from the physical measure so the jumpdiffusion model has to be either directly estimated from historical data or from a risk neutral measure adjusted with the market price of risk. Note that the regulatory requirement does not intend to determine haircuts per bond, at least for investment grade debts, which would have been hindered by the lack of constant maturity products. FSB's requirement of minimum 5 year historical data could significantly shorten the remaining maturity of a fixed maturity bond. Fortunately, regulatory haircuts are broadly based on similar bonds which allow a bond price index to be used as the proxy. The required inclusion of at least a stress period also helps reduce the maturity concern, as a stress period itself does not last long and returns during the stress period typically dominate the tail distribution. Therefore for bonds, there is no need to resort to yield dynamics, so long as the model could be separately calibrated or estimated from the most relevant historic data to reflect its duration bracket, e.g., historical prices of bonds with residual maturity of 3 to 5 years used to estimate the DEJD model for determination of haircuts of the same maturity bracket.
Credit quality of debt issuers is also a factor cited in FSB's haircut framework, which can be done by grouping similar credit quality (e.g. same rating class and maturity bucket) bonds and running the haircut model on a sample portfolio or indices. At the cusip level, DEJD model parameters such as mean, volatility can be linked to each cusip bond to fully reflect its credit quality. Market depth, bid-ask spread can be captured through the liquidity premium g.
For fixed income securities, the price process is usually derived from a no-arbitrage term structure yield model. Because the MPR is a very short period of time, e.g., in days, directly modeling the price process is also reasonable and appropriate. Bond haircuts are known to exhibit an upsloping maturity effect, i.e., bonds of longer residual maturities incur higher haircuts than bonds of shorter residual maturities. This maturity effect can be captured through bond price volatilities which generally increases on longer maturities.
Multi-period Model Considering Borrower Creditworthiness
A reverse repo is a margined secured loan economically. The joint event of an undercollateralization due to market value declines and a credit event of the counterparty results in an unsecured claim which is pari passu to the counterparty's senior unsecured obligations. Therefore the overall lending exposure can be viewed from an unsecured wholesale exposure perspective, for purposes of liquidity and capital allocation and economic performance assessment.
To take into account of borrower credit quality, we look at the loss profile of the whole lending duration, rather than a single margin period of risk. Consider a reverse repo transaction, where a hypothetic bank B lends M(t) amount of cash to client C on ∆(t) units of collateral security with a price process B
(t). At a constant haircut, M(t)=(1-h) ∆(t). Party B would have a residual wholesale exposure to party C in the senior unsecured rank of (M(τ)-∆(τ)B(τ +u)(1-g))
+ where τ is the default time of the counterparty, u is the MPR. Denote Rc C's recovery rate, Гc(t) C's default indicator, 1 if τ≤t , 0 otherwise, we write B's loss function at time t as follows,
Or in the differential form,
Comparing to equation (2), the loss given default 1-Rc applies to take into account of the recourse to the borrower C.
Corporate credit spreads are shown to exhibit log OU (Ornstein-Uhlenbeck) behavior (Duffie 2011) which is positive, mean-reverting, and highly elastic in that it allows large moves in credit spread due to its log scale. Following the reduced form approach, we write C's default intensity λc(t) as follows,
where k is the mean reversion rate, ̅ the mean reversion level, σc credit spread volatility, and dWc(t) the Brownian motion correlated to the asset diffusion process dW, <dWc(t), dW(t)> = ρdt, ρ the correlation between asset and default intensity, all defined in a proper probability space (Ω,Ƒ,P). The survival probability is then given by
The asset price process can be written in a factor form,
Suppose that we simulate a path of Wc(t), Ƒc ={Wc(t), 0≤t≤T}, then obtains path of y(t), yF(t). Conditioning on Ƒc, B(t) has a shifted drift but otherwise remains a DEJD process independent of the default time of the borrower. is the conditional default probability. The second conditional expectation is the same as in equation (10), except at a forward time t.
The time horizon T of interest is a period much longer than the MPR of 5 or 10 days. The expected loss then needs to be broken down on default time intervals and integrate over the whole duration of T.
Conditional on a default intensity path, the asset return corresponding to equation (19) has a changed drift term but otherwise remains a mixed exponential jump diffusion process, as listed below, Counterparties to SFTs wishing to adopt regulatory haircuts often find the supervisory haircuts table too general yet limited, not covering the types and risk characteristics of their collateral. Typical tri-party margin schedule lists margin ratios at much finer granularities, sometimes with close to a hundred of line items. In bilateral financing transactions, haircuts are negotiated. Good credit counterparties will ask for lower haircuts. Traders would argue that repos' tenors are shorter than the time it historically takes to develop a market-wide stress so that there is no justification of fixing haircuts levels according to stress market conditions. Counterparty dependence and procyclicality are exactly the dynamics of the bilateral repo markets and requirements of a flow repo business. The model in this section can be applied to meet these requirements.
The model discussed above works for securities lending transactions as well. A sec lender has a loss on the other side of price movement 1 − Г ∆ + − 1 + ℎ + , where the securities borrower posts up cash collateral and in such circumstances the liquidity premium is not charged. Although the wholesale exposure here is market dependent and thus not flat, credit assessment approaches typical of wholesale credits can still be applied. Same analytics applies.
Applications and Preliminary Results
In this section, we adopt the EL based haircut criteria for a candidate internal quantitative haircut model for the purposes of satisfying FSB's haircut framework requirements for noncentrally cleared securities financing transactions and for BASEL's internal haircuts model for OTC margin collateral recognition. We show that when a model is estimated from a historical data series including the crisis of 2008-2009 as a stress period, the haircuts produced match closely to the supervisory haircuts. Preliminary computational results are shown to illustrate impacts of market liquidity risk. The advantage of having an internal model is an increased flexibility and refined granularity when dealing with different asset classes and maturities when direct or reliable historical data are not available. The proposed model is a candidate for such a regulatory aimed internal model.
As for counterparty sensitive haircuts, we show the effect of the general wrong way risk (WWR) is not significant and we confirm that haircuts are indeed only weekly dependent on counterparty credit quality. Specific WWR is shown to translate into haircuts in large portion.
For SFTs with market levels of haircuts, both regulatory and economic capitals will result. A comparison of regulatory and economic capital will be given. By computing the economic capital, a capital charge can become a component of repo pricing, which is shown to far exceed the charge corresponding to expected loss.
Haircutting non-cash OTC derivatives margin collateral
Under a margin or collateral agreement such as ISDA CSA or CCP clearing agreement, ideal collateral posted are cash or cash-like treasuries so that they do not produce additional risk while serving the counterparty risk mitigation purposes. Non-cash, non-government securities however are common. According to ISDA [2015] , about 25% of total collateral is non-cash, among which 15% is non-government debts. ISDA also estimates that over 90% of non-centrally cleared OTC bilateral transactions would be subject to collateral agreement per BCBS-IOSCO's margin requirements, which may see higher proportion of non-government securities used as collateral.
To satisfy FSB's haircuts requirements of a 5 year history consisting of at least one stress period, we choose the 5 year period from 1/2/2008 to 1/2/2013 when SPX 500 index has significant stress in the second half of 2008 and early 2009. The double exponential jump diffusion model is estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation approach with likelihood functions numerically computed via the two-sided Laplacian inversion of the pdf or via the explicit formulae obtained by Ramezani and Zeng (2007) 's. Since both involve numerical truncations of infinite series or integrals, it's more of an implementation efficiency choice, once both are subject to the same error bounds. Obviously the Laplacian approach is more extensible to MEM but the results here all computed with the latter approach. Preliminary results show a tendency of reaching local minimums during optimization and no effort has been made to find the global minimum as the results are consistent and stable, albeit not strictly optimum.
The log daily return of the sample of size 1259 has a 99-percentile loss at 5.1571% and ES 6.8946% (simple return 99-percentile loss is 5.0264%. 99.9-percentile loss 9.3536%, and ES 9.4116%.) Although no effort has been made as of now to make sure the minimization routine reaches for global maximum, the estimated model is able to produce a probability of no loss at 3.82%, closely the sample VaR, vs 5.1571%. This gives us confidence that the MLE solution, if it's only a local minimum, is at least a good one and we can leave global minimization to future researches. Table 1 . Hypothetic repo haircuts with MPR=1 day showing the estimation has been able to reproduce the sample 99-percentile VaR. The EL targets are taken from Moody's idealized ELs for 1 year time horizon of 3.00E-07, 3.10E-06, 7.50E-06, and 1.66E-05 for 'Aaa', 'Aa1', 'Aa2', and 'Aa3' respectively (Bielecki 2008 Table 2 lists three estimation results of the same SPX 500 time series. In 'Est-1', all 6 DEJD model parameters are estimated with an obtained MLE of 3374. In 'Est-2', μ is taken from mean of the sample and fixed, while the rest 5 model parameters are estimated with an MLE of 3432. In 'Est-3', volatility is taken from the sample standard deviation, in addition to fixed μ, with a final MLE of 3377. The EL based haircuts results are quite stable, as shown in Figure 1 . It appears that to obtain 'Aaa' expected loss, the haircut needs to be 18.5%, and 'Aa2' 15.5%, close to 15% in BASEL III's supervisory price volatility haircut schedule. Table 3 shows haircuts predicted based on a PD scale of hypothetic 'AAA', 'AA','A' and 'BBB' ratings, and PD values of 0.001%, 0.01%, and 0.1%. 99.9-percentile, i.e., 0.1% PD produces levels close enough to 15%. Table 3 . Predicted main equity haircuts to meet hypothetic PD targets (1.34E-6, 4.51E-5, 1.31E-4 and 1.76E-3 for 'AAA', 'AA', 'A', and 'BBB' ratings respectively) with MPR=10 days under the DEJD model estimated. A haircut table can be developed for corporates, CMBS, RMBS, and ABS, with proper proxy indices identified and the jump-diffusion model estimated. Table 4 shows CMBS haircuts predicted using DEJD models of Merrill-Lynch CMBS bond price indices estimated on a historical daily price series from Jan 2008 to Jan 2013. Table 5 shows single 'A' rated US corporate bonds with residual maturities of 1 to 5 years, 5 to 10, and 10-15 years. Comparing to BASEL III's supervisory haircuts for 20% risk weighted wholesale counterparties at 4% for residual maturity of 1-5 years and 8% for 5+ years, 'Aa1' still seems the closest one. The difference in fact is in the same scale as bond market's bid/ask spreads, which can be added through the liquidity premium. These predicted haircuts, although not comprehensive, do seem to suggest that the expected loss matching the best credit quality scale satisfy FSB's qualitative regulatory standards for methodologies used by market participants that provide securities financing to calculate haircuts on the collateral received. It could be adopted as criteria for internal quantitative haircut model development.
To evaluate market liquidity risk's impact on haircuts, Table 6 shows CMBS haircuts targeting 'Aa1' EL and 99.9-percentile haircuts with liquidity premium (first two columns labeled under 'Aa1' and '99.9-tile') and the additional haircuts (in percentages) when 2% and 5% liquidity premiums are applied respectively. Roughly speaking, these liquidity premiums translate into the same magnitude of additional haircuts. An alternative to estimated model is a model calibrated to options markets, especially short maturity, deep-out-of-the money puts. This is useful for securities that don't have long enough trading history yet or when historical data is less dependable. Table x1 shows haircuts under each of the three calibrated or estimated MEM models for SPX 500 index: CKL 2013 (Cai et al 2013) is a model calibrated to SPX option smiles, Cai-Kou (2011) is also calibrated to SPX European options, the DEJD is estimated from 1962 to 2003 (Ramezani and Zeng 2007) . The last two columns show haircuts needed to produce no-loss with confidence level of 99.9 percentile and 99 percentile, respectively. Given the regulatory haircut for a main equity is specified at 15% with a 10 day MPR, M-Z 2007 model produces lower haircuts due to its estimation over a very long history, where the impact of stress periods is lessened. Cai-Kou2011 model is in line with the 15% haircut at 'Aa' level and 99.9-percentile. The option implied CKL-2013 model overshoots haircuts, although its 99-percentile haircut of 16.23% is close. This reflects the danger of employing a risk neutral option model for a real world risk measurement such as haircuts 8 . 
Haircuts for securities financing transactions
A bank determines trade haircuts in accordance with its business model and risk management capacity. If the bank treats the repo as a secured loan to be carried on its banking book, it then needs to set the haircuts at levels that produce the firm's desired lending profile for wholesale exposures and price the repo accordingly. Take for example, suppose the firm is comfortable lending out to 'A' rated wholesale clients at an interest rate of x, it could charge the same rate in a reverse repo with a 'BB' rated party, provided that the trade has a haircut designed to make the overall credit risk profile matching that of 'A' rated counterparties. On the other hand, if the firm treats repos or SFTs in general as trading activities and carry them in the trading book, the firm may trade at the market levels of haircuts and fair value the SFT book. It is expected that the firm would have to manage its counterparty credit risk, effectively treating SFTs as OTC derivatives, such is the case when a funding is done through TRS, which is derivatives. Computational results below show the banking book treatment approach while trading book fair pricing and valuation examples are given in the next subsection.
In determining a fair level of haircut for a banking book treatment, the bank can use either the VaR based haircut definition or the EL based definition. To illustrate, we consider a borrower with a 5 year CDS traded at 125 bps, roughly 'A' rated wholesale counterparty, borrowing for 1 year with SPX 500 index as collateral. The EL based haircut under Est-3 (μ, σ fixed with tail weight) targeting 'Aa2' without giving credit to the borrower's credit is 20.87% for an MPR of 10 days. With borrower's default probability considered, 10.616% suffices to reach an 'Aa2' profile under zero credit and asset correlation. If the correlation is stressed to -0.9, haircut only increases mildly by 1.18%. Last column of the table shows haircuts are less when the correlation is at 0.9, or right way risk. The effect of correlation is moderate due to the over-collateralization nature resulted from haircuts, and is expected as the loss exposure lies in the tail of asset returns where the Gaussian component of the asset dynamics is not expected to have a significant drive. Take for example when the spread volatility is doubled, while keeping the CDS spread at 250, the haircut for a BBB client would increase only 1% under -0.9 correlation. The general wrong way risk therefore is limited, obviously due to the shorter term effect and the much less pronounced loss after truncation with haircuts.
Specific wrong way risk could occur if a borrower posts its affiliates' debt instrument as collateral. A structural dependency stronger than the correlation approach will be needed. The strongest one in fact is a jump (decline) upon borrower default, which can be captured as an additional liquidation discount and added to g. Specific WWR with a 2% asset jump on borrower default has a further increase of haircut of 1.72% (third column in Table) .
As shown in Table 7 , haircuts become a tool of credit enhancement to the borrower. For example, a BB rated client entering a repo with sufficient haircuts can present an equivalent top credit risk profile.
Wholesale credit risk management standardizes around senior unsecured exposure at one year time horizon. For trades of longer or shorter terms, one may want to convert to an equivalent one year credit risk profile to allow comparisons with a firm's internal credit risk metrics. More importantly, one would want to obtain an equivalent senior unsecured exposure as a bank entering financing transactions with a borrower may have many trades each with different assets or asset classes and at different haircuts, among other term differences.
Economic capital in securities financing transactions
The essence of risks in a margin period of risk is gap risk, a gap market risk exposure contingent on counterparty default event. Gap risk is not hedgeable, just as the incomplete credit derivatives market where jump to default risk can't be meaningfully hedged. A measure of economic capital is necessary and should accompany a reasonable capital charge.
For derivatives pricing purposes, the trade's own economic capital could be the primary concern. In examples below (Table 8) , we show economic capitals of a repo transaction with a borrower with a 5y CDS at 250 bp and a correlation coefficient with SPX500 at -90%, and show how capital charge can be built into the overall repo pricing. Assuming trade haircuts of 5%, 7.5%, and 10%, we use estimated SPX500 under (Est-3, μ, σ fixed) to compute EL and EC based on VaR and ES of a one-year term repo, then apply a 15% ROE to convert to a capital charge in bps. Even at 5% haircut, the EL charge is only 0.71 bp but its capital charge is 46.5 bp. At 10% haircut, EL charge is negligible at 0.04 bp but the economic capital is zero and there is no capital charge. This shows that in repo-style transaction pricing, use of capital dominates repo spreads. Regulatory capital can be computed in a straightforward manner and compared with the economic capital. In the collateral haircut approach to compute counterparty exposure, BASEL III first determines an equivalent wholesale exposure as (E-M(1-hvol)) + where E is exposure or principal in a repo, M is collateral market value, and hvol is BASEL's volatility adjustment aka haircut. For a repo traded at haircut h such that E=M(1-h), the exposure becomes M(hvol-h) + , which is linear when h is less than hvol. For regulatory purposes, it needs to estimate loss given default (LGD) and PD (probability of Default) of an unsecured exposure of its counterparty. The borrower's PD and LGD and repo's tenor (floored at 1 year) are input to BASEL's wholesale credit risk capital requirement formulae to compute regulatory capital.
The capital charge in Table 8 is based on economic capital, as in our view, regulatory capital is a cost of doing business, best to be managed at a business level. Although the impact of economic capital on repo pricing found here is not based on econometric studies, it obviously adds to the list of determinants of repo pricing (Infante 2015 ) the cost of capital as a new and significant one. To further highlight the difference between economic capital and regulatory capital, we consider a one year repo trade with a hypothetic 'BBB' rated counterparty with 5 year CDS at 250 bp on US main equities collateral. Based on BASEL III, the repo has no exposure when the haircut is greater or equal to the supervisory market price volatility of 15%, assuming 10 day MPR. When haircut is less than 15%, the difference becomes the exposure which is applied with a risk weight of 191% assuming 3.08% PD and 60% LGD for the counterparty with a stressed correlation factor of 1.25 and a multiplier 1.06 applied. The regulatory capital increases linearly from zero to 2.3% at zero haircut. The economic capital calculated at 99.9 percentile ES has a maximum of 6.58% at zero haircut, about three times of the maximum regulatory capital. Note that ES drops to zero around 15% haircut where the probability of no loss is greater than 99.9%. Figure 2 shows that the regulatory capital over estimates the economic capital in the range of 10% to 15% haircut and underestimate EC when trade haircut moves further away from the 15% cutoff. Comparing to the real economic capital, the regulatory capital basically penalizes low risk trades (when haircuts are high) and undercuts high risk (when haircuts are low.)
Note that in Table 7 , the predicted haircut for Aa2 with a 'BBB' counterparty at zero correlation is 12.337%. So for haircuts lower than this level, economic capital has to be considered and becomes a dominant component of repo pricing spread.
Conclusion
While the VaR based regulatory haircuts methodology is well versed, we seek to establish haircuts methodologies for securities financing business where haircuts are believed counterparty dependent. A method similar to the regulatory haircut is to find a haircut such that the resultant one year, 99.9-percentile CVaR of a repo is zero. Conventional credit rating approaches based on expected loss or probability of default can also be adopted. A firm, for example, can solve haircuts such that the exposure to market risk meets a near-cash credit quality, i.e., the highest credit rating scale measured by expected loss.
Double exponential jump-diffusion type processes are shown to be able to produce haircut levels consistent with BASEL's supervisory haircuts, when a stress period is included in the model estimation. The advantage of having a mathematic model is to deal when pricing history is not reliably available, when then the model can be inferred from options markets. For less liquid debt instruments, the model can serve as a reasonable extrapolation tool for haircuts. Numerical techniques employing two-sided Laplace transform inversion and maximum likelihood estimation of the asset model are applied to predict haircuts of SPX500 index, US corporate bond and CMBS indices. The expected loss based haircut definition can also be adopted as an alternative criteria for firms to develop internal model based haircuts methodologies for regulatory capital purposes. For repos, the haircuts model incorporates asset risk in both volatility and jumps, borrower credit risk, wrong way risk, and market liquidity risk. As is expected of normal circumstances, haircuts are only weakly dependent on counterparty credit and correlation between asset and counterparty.
For SFT trades with negotiated haircuts, we show that trade expected loss is very small and often negligible comparing to economic capital so that a capital charge has to be collected to compensate the lender's undertaking of the gap risk. The haircut model allows more complex SFT product designs such as dynamic haircuts and extended repo tenors.
